Line

At present, Israel does not have a clearly defined and internationally recognized eastern border. Depending on the context, various lines of demarcation may be referenced: the boundaries proposed by the 1947 UN Partition Plan; the 1949 Armistice Line established following the War of Independence; the 1967 boundaries resulting from the Six-Day War; as well as the provisions of the Oslo Accords and the unresolved international status of Israeli settlements beyond the Green Line.

Within the framework of the Metatron Project, the 1949 Armistice Line is proposed as the basis for delineation. The main arguments in support of this approach are outlined below.

Rationale for the 1949 Armistice Line

• Historical and Legal Foundations
  • The 1949 Armistice Line served as a starting point for subsequent peace initiatives, including negotiations on the establishment of a Palestinian state.
  • The international community, in most cases, refers to the “pre-1967 borders” as a basis for future agreements, which enhances the line’s perceived legitimacy under international law.
• A Compromise Framework
  • The 1947 UN Partition borders are generally viewed as overly generous to the Palestinians from an Israeli perspective, whereas the 1967 boundaries are widely regarded as the result of unlawful occupation under international consensus.
  • The 1949 Armistice Line presents a potential middle ground: for Israelis, it preserves strategically significant positions; for Palestinians, it allows for the creation of a state within a framework already acknowledged by the global community.
• Defensive Legitimacy
  • Constructing a protective barrier along the 1949 line may be perceived as the natural safeguarding of recognized national borders.
  • Such an initiative could be framed as a standard defensive measure, comparable to those implemented by other sovereign states, strengthening its legitimacy in the eyes of the international community.
• Additional Supporting Considerations
  • This was a de facto border that existed for 18 years and proved operationally sustainable for Israel.
  • It is more acceptable to the international community than the post-1967 territorial reality.
  • Palestinians previously resided beyond this line (under Jordanian and Egyptian control), which may ease future territorial arrangements.
  • Finally, it represents the minimum concession Israel might offer while retaining the majority of its strategically vital areas.

Counterarguments and Alternatives

• Domestic Political Risks for Israel
  • Segments of the Israeli right wing and settler communities may view the 1949 Armistice Line as an excessive concession, as it may place areas of historical or strategic significance, such as parts of Judea and Samaria, outside the state’s effective control.
  • Even if the line is optimal from the standpoint of international law and security policy, it could trigger internal political tensions.
• Geopolitical Considerations
  • Should the Palestinian side and neighboring Arab states accept this compromise, it may contribute to regional stabilization. However, there remains a risk that the lack of final status recognition for certain areas could give rise to renewed disputes in the future.
  • An alternative approach could involve a “hybrid” border configuration: the 1949 Armistice Line would serve as the principal alignment, while contested areas would be subject to further demarcation and mutually agreed land swaps. Such arrangements have been proposed in past peace negotiations.
• International Legitimacy
  • If the 1967 border is taken as a basis, it is categorically rejected under international law, as the territory is regarded as occupied.
  • The 1949 Armistice Line, while not without its shortcomings, at least corresponds to the concept of “pre-1967 borders,” making it the most neutral option for discussion.
• Additional Objections
  • The status of Jerusalem remains subject to further negotiation.
  • Relocation of settlements in the West Bank – where dozens currently exist – could provoke a major internal crisis in Israel.
  • The question of the Golan Heights, particularly the eastern shoreline of the Sea of Galilee, should be addressed independently within the context of a comprehensive peace agreement with Syria.

Additional Arguments in Favor of the 1949 Armistice Line

• The 1947 UN Partition Plan (Resolution 181) Was Unworkable
  • The territorial configuration of the proposed states under the 1947 UN Partition Plan was highly fragmented and geographically impractical, posing significant obstacles to effective governance.
  • The Arab states not only rejected the plan but launched a war in response, which may be interpreted as a de facto repudiation of the resolution.
  • Nevertheless, the United Nations continues to reference the plan as a legitimate historical baseline.
• The 1967 Lines Lack International Recognition
  • The territories occupied by Israel in the 1967 war are widely regarded by the international community, including the UN, the European Union, Russia, China, and most other countries, as occupied territory under international law.
  • While the United States under President Trump recognized Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights and Jerusalem, this remains an isolated position and does not represent a broader international trend.
• The 1949 Armistice Line Was a War Outcome That Could Have Been Sustainable
  • Israel signed armistice agreements with Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria following the 1948 war. Although these borders were not intended to be final, they provided a workable framework for nearly two decades.
  • Between 1949 and 1967, Jordan administered the West Bank and Egypt controlled Gaza, yet neither established a Palestinian state in these territories, undermining claims that they inherently belong to the Palestinians.
  • The 1967 war fundamentally changed the strategic environment, as Israel occupied territories from which existential threats had previously emerged, complicating future arrangements.
• A Palestinian State Will Require Territorial Compromise
  • Without significant portions of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the creation of a viable Palestinian state is not possible.
  • Israeli leaders, including Ariel Sharon, Ehud Olmert, and even Benjamin Netanyahu, have, at various times, publicly acknowledged the possibility of relinquishing parts of these territories under specific conditions.

Segment Classification Map

The maps below present the proposed alignment of the Metatron Wall, divided into functional segments. Each segment is color-coded to reflect the extent of required coordination and the level of international alignment:

• Green segments represent sections that follow Israel’s internationally recognized borders, including those with Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon. Construction in these areas will take place entirely within sovereign Israeli territory, without crossing any disputed lines, and does not require prior diplomatic arrangements, provided that all environmental, hydrological, engineering, and construction standards are met.
• Yellow segments are located adjacent to the Gaza Strip or along the border with Syria. While construction will take place exclusively within Israeli territory, implementation in these areas requires additional coordination measures. These may include limited deviations from the 1949 Armistice Line, guarantees for humanitarian access, technical coordination with international actors, and consideration of the sensitivities of neighboring parties regarding engineering activity near the border.
• Red segments correspond to areas bordering the West Bank. The wall will follow the 1949 Armistice Line without encroaching on disputed lands; however, due to the political sensitivity of these areas, construction is subject to prior agreements concerning territorial swaps, bypassing densely populated zones, and diplomatic verification of the route.

The total planned length of the Metatron Wall is 1,115 kilometers, distributed as follows:

• Green segments: 657 km (58.9%)
• Yellow segments: 106 km (9.5%)
• Red segments: 352 km (31.6%)

This segmentation does not reflect the legal legitimacy of the wall’s path, which remains entirely within Israeli territory, but rather the degree of procedural coordination required for its realization.

Conclusion: The 1949 Armistice Line as a Compromise

Although the 1949 Armistice Line was established as the outcome of military hostilities, it has, over time, gained partial recognition in international discourse as a reference point for negotiations on a two-state solution. Unlike the borders resulting from the 1967 war, the 1949 line is not broadly viewed as a manifestation of territorial expansion, which improves its acceptability on the international stage. For Israel, the 1949 line could serve as a workable compromise – imperfect for all parties, yet capable of balancing the interests of right-wing constituencies, settler communities, and the international community, including the Arab League, the United Nations, and a majority of Muslim-majority states.

By contrast, other alternatives, such as the 1947 UN Partition lines or the 1967 boundaries, would either require extensive Israeli concessions or fail to meet the criteria of international legality.

Taking into account all relevant considerations, the 1949 Armistice Line emerges as the least contentious basis for the construction of a defensive barrier:

• For Israel: It allows for the preservation of strategically vital areas without encroaching upon highly disputed zones—an essential factor for maintaining internal stability and securing support from conservative political blocs and settlement groups.
• For the international community: It aligns with the substance of multiple UN resolutions and the prevailing two-state paradigm, thereby enhancing the perceived legitimacy of defensive infrastructure.
• For Arab states: It provides a platform for renewed negotiations regarding the future of a Palestinian state, without evoking the optics of unilateral territorial annexation.

In conclusion, while no demarcation will fully satisfy all stakeholders, the 1949 Armistice Line represents the most viable and diplomatically defensible compromise. Its adoption could help legitimize the wall as a component of national defense, comparable to any internationally recognized border security mechanism, and lay the groundwork for broader, long-term conflict resolution.